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THE DIFFICULTY OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT IN CANADA 
RICHARD ALBERT† 
Scholars of comparative constitutional law would suggest that the United States 
Constitution is the world’s most difficult democratic constitution to change by formal amendment. 
But in this paper I suggest that the Constitution of Canada may be even harder to amend. Modern 
Canadian political history has proven the textual requirements for major constitutional 
amendment so far impossible to satisfy, yet the extraordinary difficulty of formal amendment in 
Canada derives equally from sources external to the Constitution’s formal amendment rules. 
Major constitutional amendment also requires conformity with extra-textual requirements 
imposed by Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Constitution of Canada, parliamentary and 
provincial as well as territorial statutes, and arguably also by constitutional conventions—
additional rules that may well make major constitutional amendment impossible today in Canada. 
These as-yet underappreciated extra-textual sources of formal amendment difficulty raise 
important questions for Canadian constitutionalism, namely whether in making the Constitution 
virtually impossible to amend they weaken democracy and undermine the purpose of writtenness. 
I. INTRODUCTION 2
II. FORMAL AMENDMENT RULES IN DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONS 5
A. Studies of Amendment Difficulty 6
B. Rigid Constitutions and their Amendment Rules 8
C. Formal Amendment Rules in Canada 9
III. EXTRA-TEXTUAL AMENDMENT RULES IN CANADA 12
A. Statutory Conditions 13
B. Popular Expectations 16
C. Judicial Standards 19
IV. CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONALISM AND FORMAL AMENDMENT 22
A. Democracy and Amendment 22
B. The Weakening of Writtenness 23
C. Formal Amendment Rules and the Value of Writtenness 26
V. CONCLUSION 27
†
 Associate Professor, Boston College Law School; Yale University (J.D., B.A.); Oxford University (B.C.L.); Harvard 
University (LL.M.). Email: richard.albert@bc.edu. I have benefitted from comments on earlier drafts of this Article 
from Joel Colón-Ríos, Xenophon Contiades, Derek O’Brien and the three anonymous reviewers, commissioned by 
the Alberta Law Review, who recommended this paper for publication. I have also received useful suggestions in the 
course of presentations at Boston College, McGill University, Queen’s University and Oxford University. My thanks 
to the Boston College Law School Fund for so generously supporting my scholarly research. 
RICHARD ALBERT   ALBERTA LAW REVIEW (forthcoming 2015) (peer-reviewed)  
2 | P a g e .
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Constitution is widely regarded as one of the world’s most difficult 
democratic constitutions to change by a formal constitutional amendment.1 Formal amendment in 
the United States requires two-thirds consent in both houses of Congress to propose an amendment 
and the approval of three-quarters of the states to ratify it.2 As hard as it may have been at the 
founding to assemble those supermajorities among 59 Representatives, 20 Senators, 13 states and 
no political parties,3 it is much harder today with 435 Representatives, 100 Senators, 50 states and 
hyper-partisan political parties.4 Perhaps the best evidence of the difficulty of formal amendment 
in the United States is the historical rate of amendment failure. Of the more than 11,000 
amendments proposed since 1789, only 27 have been ratified,5 an astonishingly low number by 
comparison with modern constitutional democracies.6 Scholars have therefore suggested that the 
United States Constitution may today very well be impossible to change by formal amendment.7  
No one can deny the difficulty of amending the United States Constitution. But the 
Constitution of Canada may be even harder to amend. The principal source of amendment 
difficulty is the Constitution Act, 1982, which creates an onerous escalating structure of five formal 
amendment rules that impose increasingly demanding thresholds,8 each of which is keyed to 
specific constitutional commitments.9 Modern political history is an additional source of 
amendment difficulty. The failure of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords have proven 
major constitutional amendments so far impossible to achieve,10 and the prevailing culture of 
amendment failure may dissuade political actors from undertaking similarly grand efforts at 
constitutional renewal.11 But another source of amendment difficulty remains underappreciated. 
1
 See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Our Undemocratic Constitution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) at 21; 
Donald S. Lutz, Principles of Constitutional Design (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006) at 170;; Dieter 
Grimm, “Types of Constitutions’ in Michel Rosenfeld & András Sajó, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Comparative 
Constitutional Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at 111; Mark Tushnet, “Marbury v. Madison Around the 
World” (2004) 71 Tenn. L. Rev. 251 at 260 n.36.  
2
 U.S. Const., art. V (1789). The Constitution also authorizes amendment by constitutional convention in a special 
assembly convened for that purpose but this convention process has never been successfully used. See William B. 
Fisch, “Constitutional Referendum in the United States of America” (2006) 54 Am. J. Comp. L. 485 at 490. 
3 Eric Posner, “The U.S. Constitution is Impossible to Amend” (2004) Slate.com, online: 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2014/05/amending_the_constitution_is_much
_too_hard_blame_the_founders.html (last accessed November 1, 2014). 
4
 See Richard Albert, “Constitutional Disuse or Desuetude: The Case of Article V” (2014) 94 B.U. L. Rev. 1029 at 
1048-51. 
5
 Kathleen M. Sullivan, “Constitutional Constancy: Why Congress Should Cure Itself of Amendment Fever” (1996) 
17 Cardozo L. Rev. 690 at 691. 
6
 For example, as of 2013, the Indian Constitution had been formally amended 98 times since its adoption in 1950 and 
the South African Constitution had already been formally amended 17 times since its adoption in 1996. 
7
 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “American Constitutionalism, Almost (But Not Quite) Version 2.0” (2012) 65 Me. 
L. Rev. 77 at 92; H.B. Higgins, “The Rigid Constitution” (1905) 20 Pol. Sci. Q. 203 at 210; Miguel Schor, “Judicial 
Review and American Constitutional Exceptionalism” (2008) 46 Osgoode Hall L.J. 535 at 540. 
8
 Procedure for Amending Constitution of Canada, Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the 
Canada Act 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.) (“Constitution Act, 1982”). 
9
 For a comparative analysis of Canada’s escalating structure of formal amendment rules, see Richard Albert, “The 
Structure of Constitutional Amendment Rules” (2014) 49 Wake Forest L. Rev. 913. 
10
 See 1987 Constitutional Accord, Schedule to Constitutional Amendment, 1987, July 3, 1987 (“Meech Lake 
Accord”); Consensus Report on the Constitution, Charlottetown, August 28, 1992 (“Charlottetown Accord”). 
11
 Ronald L. Watts, “Canada: Three Decades of Periodic Federal Crises” (1996) 17 Int’l Pol. Sci. Rev. 353 at 368. 
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The extraordinary difficulty of formal amendment in Canada derives equally from sources 
external to the Constitution’s formal amendment rules. The supermajority and federalist thresholds 
entrenched in the Constitution Act, 1982 are demanding on their own, but major constitutional 
amendment now also requires conformity with extra-textual requirements imposed by Supreme 
Court decisions interpreting the Constitution of Canada, parliamentary and provincial as well as 
territorial statutes, and arguably by constitutional conventions, by which I mean the unwritten yet 
binding constitutional norms that develop in the course of constitutional politics. These extra-
textual requirements for formal amendment appear nowhere in the text of the Constitution Act, 
1982 but they are perhaps just as significant as the ones that do. Uncodified though broadly 
recognized as valid, they so exceedingly complicate the process of formal amendment that we 
might more accurately speak of amendment impossibility rather than mere difficulty.  
Canada is course not the only country whose formal amendment rules are susceptible to 
informal modification by judicial interpretation, legislative or executive action and constitutional 
convention. Indeed, I am currently completing a paper in which I identify and evaluate a global 
trend in the informal modification of formal amendment rules.12 The most well-known 
manifestation of informal changes to formal amendment rules is the judicial creation of the basic 
structure doctrine, most commonly associated with the Indian Supreme Court.13 The Court has 
developed, in the course of its common law constitutional interpretation, a theory of the implicit 
unamendability of certain constitutive features of the “basic structure” of the Indian Constitution, 
namely federalism, the separation of powers and secularism.14 The consequence of the basic 
structure doctrine has been to impose court-created limits on the textually unlimited power of 
political actors to formally amend the Indian Constitution.15 India, then, demonstrates the 
phenomenon I explore in this Article. Nonetheless, this phenomenon—the development of extra-
textual rules of formal amendment—is most apparent to me in its richness and complexity in 
Canada, where it derives not only from judicial interpretation but also from legislation, executive 
action and convention. Canada therefore offers a valuable case study to illustrate how it arises. 
In this Article, I suggest that major constitutional amendment to the Constitution of Canada 
may today be impossible. Although I make some empirical comparisons, this paper is not 
principally an empirical inquiry in amendment difficulty largely because, as I will explain below,16 
empirical studies of amendment difficulty pose analytical challenges that I or indeed others are not 
yet equipped to overcome. I instead draw from existing empirical studies to explore in comparative 
perspective the difficulty of major constitutional amendment in Canada in light of both the codified 
and uncodified rules of formal amendment. I begin, in Part II, by situating the difficulty of 
12
 Richard Albert, “The Informal Amendment of Formal Amendment Rules” (draft on file with author). 
13
 For a description of the basic structure doctrine, see Richard Albert, “The Unamendable Core of the United States 
Constitution” in András Koltay, Comparative Perspectives on the Fundamental Freedom of Expression (forthcoming 
2015), available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2601646 (last accessed November 1, 2014); Sudhir Krishnaswamy, 
Democracy and Constitutionalism in India: A Study of the Basic Structure Doctrine (Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press, 2009). 
14 See Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. Kerala, 1973 SCC (4) 225, available at: 
http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/25786 (last accessed November 1, 2014) at para. 316. But the Court has been 
“deliberately vague about exactly what counts as part of that ‘basic structure.’” Pratap Bhanu Mehta, “The Rise of 
Judicial Sovereignty” (2007) 18 J. Democracy 70 at 76. 
15
 The Indian Constitution establishes no subject-matter constraints on formal amendment. See India Const., pt. XX, 
art. 36 (1950). 
16
 See infra Section II.A. 
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Canada’s formal amendment rules among amendment rules in other democratic constitutions. In 
Part III, I explain and evaluate how political actors have created extra-textual amendment rules 
that now exacerbate the difficulty of Canada’s already onerous formal amendment rules. In Part 
IV, I offer brief reflections on whether these extra-textual foundations of formal amendment 
difficulty are problematic for Canadian constitutionalism. I suggest that these extra-textual 
restrictions undermine the exercise of democracy and transform the written constitution into an 
incomplete code for the accomplishment of a task that is by definition rooted in textual authority. 
First, however, by way of introduction, I define two important terms. I am concerned in 
this Article with the possibility of major reforms to the framework and identity of the state, what 
I refer to in this paper as major constitutional amendments to the Constitution of Canada. I define 
this to mean what Peter Russell understood as the kinds of changes achievable only through “mega 
constitutional politics,” which is to say those changes that “address the very nature of the political 
community on which the constitution is based,” that have a “tendency to touch citizens’ sense of 
identity and self-worth,” and that are “concerned with reaching agreement on the identity and 
fundamental principles of the body politic.”17 These kinds of amendments are possible only with 
the default multilateral and unanimity amendment procedures in the Constitution of Canada.18 
These two onerous thresholds have been satisfied collectively only once since they came into force 
three decades ago.19 The rest of Canada’s ten formal amendments—as of 2015, there have been a 
total of eleven—have occurred using the Constitution’s other formal amendment procedures, 20 
each of which demands considerably lower thresholds of political agreement for their successful 
use.21 Below, I discuss in detail the five formal amendment procedures open to political actors.22 
Second, my purpose in this Article is to explain why it is so difficult to formally amend the 
Constitution of Canada. Formal amendment refers to textual alterations to the Constitution. I do 
not inquire in this Article into the relative ease or difficulty of informal amendment, which occurs 
when the Constitution changes in meaning without a corresponding alteration to its text.23 I have 
written elsewhere in detail about this phenomenon of informal amendment with particular respect 
17
 See Peter H. Russell, Constitutional Odyssey: Can Canadians Become a Sovereign People? (University of Toronto 
Press 1992) at 75. 
18
 As I discuss below, the Constitution of Canada entrenches five formal amendment procedures. See infra Section 
II.C. Each may be used on its own to make important changes to the Constitution, and indeed most of the changes to
the codified Constitution of Canada have occurred using neither the default multilateral amendment procedure nor the 
unanimity procedure. Ibid. Nonetheless, I focus in this Article on those two formal amendment because they are the 
ones that best reflect the Constitution of Canada’s recognition of the possibility of major constitutional amendment. 
19
 See Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed., Vol. 1 (loose-leaf updated 2012, release 1) (Toronto: 
Carswell, 2007) at 1-7—1-8 n.32. 
20
 See Ian Greene, “Constitutional Amendment in Canada and the United States” in Stephen L. Newman, ed., 
Constitutional Politics in Canada and the United States (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2004) at 
254. 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 See infra Section II.C. 
23
 Heather K. Gerken, “The Hydraulics of Constitutional Reform: A Skeptical Response to Our Undemocratic 
Constitution” (2007) 55 Drake L. Rev. 925 at 929. For useful reflections on the challenge of identifying amendment-
level changes, see Sanford Levinson, “How Many Times Has the United Constitution Been Amended? (A) <26; (B) 
26; (C) 27; (D) >27: Accounting for Constitutional Change’ in Sanford Levinson, ed., Responding to Imperfection 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995) at 25-26. 
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to Canada,24 where the Constitution has changed informally more frequently than formally.25 
Informal amendment is therefore at the core of constitutional change in Canada. But it is precisely 
because of the infrequency of formal amendment that it is important to separate formal from 
informal amendment—in order to understand why the former is today less likely than the latter, 
and indeed perhaps impossible under the current structure of formal amendment in Canada. 
II. FORMAL AMENDMENT RULES IN DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONS 
 
The study of comparative amendment difficulty could conceivably lend itself well to 
empirical analysis. We could, for example, compare the number of amendments across 
jurisdictions, noting that the United States Constitution has been amended 27 times since its 
coming-into-force in 1789 as compared to 11 times in Canada since the entrenchment of its modern 
constitutional text in 1982.26 But this comparative exercise would help us track amendment 
frequency, not necessarily amendment difficulty. We could alternatively compare thresholds for 
formal amendment. But it is not clear that the three-quarters threshold for state ratification in the 
United States is harder to satisfy than the default multilateral amendment procedure in Canada.27 
  
The point is that measuring amendment difficulty is itself a difficult task.28 What may 
matter even more to the study of amendment difficulty than voting thresholds for proposing and 
ratifying a formal amendment is the amendment culture in a constitutional tradition, meaning how 
often and successfully amendment has been contemplated and ultimately pursued.29 The national 
culture of amendment may also change over time as political actors, institutions and the people 
grow more or less amenable to the high costs of undertaking changes to their constitution. What is 
more, measuring amendment culture—if one can reliably identify it30—is further complicated by 
variations in amendment cultures within federal systems,31 meaning that subnational states might 
differ among themselves and as between themselves and the national state in their inclination to 
                                                 
24
 See generally Richard Albert, “Constitutional Amendment by Stealth” (forthcoming 2015) 60 McGill L.J.; Richard 
Albert (evaluating constitutional amendment by convention); Richard Albert, “Amending Constitutional Amendment 
Rules” (forthcoming 2015) 13 Int’l J. Const. L. (discussing constitutional amendment by convention); Richard Albert, 
“Constitutional Amendment by Constitutional Desuetude” (2014) 62 Am. J. Comp. L. (theorizing constitutional 
amendment by convention); Richard Albert, “Constructive Unamendability in Canada and the United States” (2014) 
67 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 181 (examining the relationship between constitutional rigidity and constitutional amendment 
by constitutional convention). For a discussion of the forms of informal amendment in the United States, see Albert, 
supra note 4, at 1060-71. 
25
 See Allan C. Hutchinson, “Constitutional Change and Constitutional Amendment: A Canadian Codundrum” in 
Xenophon Contiades, ed., Engineering Constitutional Change: A Comparative Perspective on Europe, Canada and 
the USA (Abington, UK: Routledge 2013) 51 at 57-70. 
26
 Hogg, supra note 19.  
27
 Compare U.S. Const., art. V with Constitution Act, 1982, pt. V, s. 38. I explain in Section II.C, infra, what the 
default multilateral amendment procedure is and why we can properly describe it as Canada’s default amendment rule. 
28
 Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, “Does the Constitutional Amendment Rule Matter at All? Amendment Cultures 
and the Challenges of Measuring Amendment Difficulty” (forthcoming 2014) 12 Int’l J. Const. L. 
29
 Ibid. 
30
 See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-Government (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001) 
at 22. 
31
 Ginsburg & Melton, supra note 28. 
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undertake a national-scale amendment. It is therefore difficult to conclude with any confidence 
that one constitution is harder to amend than another where both appear rigid from experience.32 
A. Studies of Amendment Difficulty 
 
What makes this comparative enterprise particularly challenging with respect to Canada is 
the difficulty of identifying what precisely constitutes an amendment. The definition of a formal 
amendment—an alteration to the constitutional text33—maps comfortably onto a master-text 
constitutional regime governed under a codified constitution. But Canada does not have a master-
text constitution. It has a partially written and unwritten constitution that operates differently from 
the conventional model of a master-text regime like the United States. Some parts of the 
Constitution of Canada are codified—making it seem like a master-text constitutional regime, 
others are written yet disaggregated, and still others are altogether unwritten. This makes it hard 
to identify the complete universe of the materials and principles that possess constitutional status, 
and in turn to identify when a change requires recourse to the procedures of formal amendment.34  
 
The codified Constitution of Canada both clarifies and complicates this conceptual 
challenge. It clarifies some questions by identifying what counts as “constitutional” in Canada. 
The Constitution Act, 1982 entrenches a list of the items that comprise the Constitution of 
Canada.35 But this clarification is also a complication because the very same list suggests that it is 
a non-exhaustive enumeration. The key word, reproduced below from the enumeration in the 
Constitution Act, 1982 is “includes”, which suggests that other items qualify as part of the 
Constitution of Canada but are just not listed in the Constitution. Here is the relevant text: 
 
(2) The Constitution of Canada includes 
(a) the Canada Act 1982, including this Act; 
(b) the Acts and orders referred to in the schedule; and 
(c) any amendment to any Act or order referred to in paragraph (a) or (b).36 
 
The “Constitution of Canada” of course also includes the preambular declarations of values and 
other commitments in the Constitution Acts, 1867 to 1982, namely the preambular statement in the 
Constitution Act, 1867, which states in part that Canada shall have “a Constitution similar in 
                                                 
32
 For example, in his classification scheme, one scholar suggests though does not state that the Australian and 
Canadian Constitutions are similarly difficult to amend given that they both (sometimes) require a simple legislative 
vote followed by approval by provincial legislatures, and that both are easier as compared to the United States 
Constitution, which requires two-thirds legislative vote followed by three-quarters ratification by the states. See 
Edward Schneier, Crafting Constitutional Democracies (Maryland: Rowman & Littlfield, 2006) at 224-225. But how 
can we be certain that any of these three constitutions is harder or easier to amend than the South African Constitution, 
which (sometimes) requires a three-fourths legislative vote and majority approval by the provinces, or even the 
Eritrean Constitution, which requires a three-fourths legislative vote and a further four-fifth legislative vote one year 
later. Ibid. at 225. Knowing as a certainty requires some demonstrated insights drawn from analyses of several 
indicators, including political culture, legislative capacity, party politics, historical amendability, rates of popular 
participation and the effectiveness of the separation of powers. 
33
 See supra Part I. Note furthermore that my focus in this Article is the difficulty of only major formal amendment. 
34
 See Lutz, supra note 1, at 179 n.16. 
35
 See Constitution Act, 1982, pt. VII, s. 52(2). 
36
 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
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Principle to that of the United Kingdom”.37 How are we to identify a formal amendment to this 
preambular value?38 As I suggest in the pages below, the indeterminacy of the identity, scope and 
meaning of Canada’s unwritten constitutional principles is itself a source of formal amendment 
difficulty insofar as it shifts to the judiciary the responsibility to identify what is amendable and 
how, that is to say according to which of Canada’s five formal amendment procedures.39 
Notwithstanding this conceptual challenge as to formal amendment in Canada and in other states 
without a master-text constitution, the challenges of measuring amendment difficulty have not 
prevented scholars from venturing attempts to measure amendment difficulty across jurisdictions.  
 
 Donald Lutz has produced the leading study of comparative amendment difficulty.40 Lutz 
endeavours to quantify the difficulty of each discrete step in an amendment process in order to 
estimate the relative difficulty of whole amendment processes. Lutz identifies 68 possible steps in 
an amendment process, for instance initiation by an executive or a specially appointed body, and 
ratification by referendum requiring an absolute majority.41 Aggregating the scores for each of 36 
democratic countries in his study sample—Lutz does not rank Canada because of his stated 
difficulty in determining what has constitutional status42—he concludes that the United States 
Constitution (5.10) ranks as the most rigid, followed by Switzerland (4.75) and Venezuela (4.75), 
then Australia (4.65), Costa Rica (4.10), Spain (3.60) and Italy (3.40).43 Lutz finds that New 
Zealand (0.50) has the easiest “constitution” to amend,44 which makes sense given that it is closest 
to a model of pure parliamentary sovereignty where changes occur by simple legislative vote.45 
  
 There are other scholarly studies of amendment difficulty. Astrid Lorenz has designed her 
own scale to measure 39 stable democracies and concluded that Belgium (9.5) has the highest 
index of amendment difficulty, followed closely by the United States (9.0) and then the 
Netherlands (8.5).46 The next three hardest-to-amend are tied: Australia (8.0), Denmark and 
Japan.47 Canada (7.0) was next, tied with Chile and Switzerland. The easiest constitutions to amend 
on her scale are the constitutions of the United Kingdom (1.0) and New Zealand (1.0).48 For his 
part, Arend Lijphart has evaluated how 36 democracies operationalize formal amendment in terms 
of their required majorities. Lijphart ranked five constitutions in the top group (4.0) of amendment 
difficulty given their requirement of super-majorities greater than two-thirds: Australia, Canada, 
                                                 
37
 Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3 (U.K.), prmbl. (“Constitution Act, 1867”). 
38
 The value commitment reflected in the “Similar-in-Principle” Clause was superseded at least in part when a majority 
of Canadian political actors agreed to the Constitution Act, 1982, in so doing transforming Canada into a model of 
constitutional sovereignty rooted in institutional roles inconsistent with the model of parliamentary sovereignty then-
existing in the United Kingdom. See Richard Albert, “Advisory Review” (2008) 45 Alta. L. Rev. 1037 at 1048-50. 
39
 A detailed discussion of these five amendment procedures follows below. See infra Section II.C. 
40
 Lutz, supra note 1, at 166. 
41
 Ibid. at 166-67. 
42
 Ibid. at 179 n.16. 
43
 Ibid. at 170. 
44
 It is unusual to refer to the “New Zealand Constitution,” since it might suggest exclusive reference to the 
Constitution Act 1986, which forms only part of New Zealand’s “constitution,” much of which is both written and 
unwritten, and therefore certainly not codified in a master-text. Nonetheless, I refer to New Zealand as having an 
amendable constitution in order to track Lutz’s own study of amendability in New Zealand. See ibid. at 125, 170, 176. 
45
 Ibid. at 170, 176. 
46
 Astrid Lorenz, “How to Measure Constitutional Rigidity” (2005) 17 J. Theoretical Pol. 339 at 358-59. 
47
 Ibid. 
48
 Ibid. 
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Japan, Switzerland and the United States.49 Germany (3.5) ranks immediately behind, followed by 
16 countries tied below (3.0) in light of their two-thirds requirement or its equivalent.50 The next 
group of eight countries (2.0) requires something between an ordinary majority and two-thirds 
majorities. The last group, requiring only ordinary majorities (1.0), includes six countries.51  
B. Rigid Constitutions and their Amendment Rules 
 
In their comparative studies of amendment difficulty, scholars have identified certain 
features associated with greater rigidity than flexibility.52 Lutz, for example, assigns the highest 
level of amendment difficulty to procedures that require a petition signed by more than 500,000 
voters to initiate an amendment or those that condition ratification on unanimous approval by 
subnational governments.53 The next-most difficult amendment feature conditions ratification on 
a majority of voters and a majority of states.54 Lutz also assigns high measures of difficulty to 
procedures requiring two separate two-thirds votes in a bicameral legislature in order to either 
initiate or ratify an amendment, three-quarters votes among subnational legislatures or conventions 
to initiate or ratify an amendment, and a petition signed by 250,000-500,000 voters to initiate an 
amendment.55 In contrast, Lutz assigns the lowest level of difficulty to amendment procedures 
requiring executive action alone to initiate an amendment, one-third or fewer votes in a specially 
constituted body to ratify an amendment, one-third majority or less in a unicameral legislature to 
ratify an amendment, or an election between two votes to either initiate or ratify an amendment.56  
 
We can calculate how Lutz arrived at the specific scores for the constitutions in his study 
sample. Take, for example, the United States Constitution, which scored 5.10, the highest score, 
for constitutional rigidity. Under Article V, the amending clause in the United States, the bicameral 
Congress must vote by two-thirds to initiate an amendment,57 a process that is worth 1.60 points 
toward the entire score. Next, a successful Article V amendment requires at least three-quarters of 
the states to ratify the initiated amendment in, a step that counts for 3.50 points. The sum of both 
parts of the Article V process is therefore 5.10.58 We can work through the same calculation for 
Japan, for instance,59 which scored 3.10 on Lutz’s index of amendment difficulty. This score is the 
                                                 
49
 Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 199) at 220. 
50
 Ibid. 
51
 Ibid. 
52
 Lijphart focuses his own analysis on the quantum of legislative agreement— ranging from super- to ordinary 
majorities—required to approve an amendment. See text accompanying notes 46-48. 
53
 Lutz, supra note 1, at 167-68. 
54
 Ibid. at 168. 
55
 Ibid. at 167-68. 
56
 Ibid. at 167-68. See text accompanying notes 37-42.  
57
 U.S. Const., art. V (1789): 
The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to 
this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a 
Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as 
part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the several States, or by 
Conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the 
Congress: Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred 
and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and 
that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate. 
58
 Lutz, supra note 1, at 169. 
59
 Japan Const., ch. IX, art. 96 (1947): 
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sum of the value assigned to initiating an amendment by two-thirds majority in the bicameral Diet 
(1.60) and ratifying it in a referendum requiring a majority vote (1.50).60 Similarly, the process of 
amending the New Zealand constitution, whose score on his index of amendment difficulty is 0.50, 
requires only a majority vote in the unicameral legislature, a procedure Lutz values at 0.50.61 
C. Formal Amendment Rules in Canada 
 
The formal amendment rules entrenched in the Constitution of Canada reflect many of the 
features that, either by causation or correlation, are associated with amendment difficulty. 
Although Lutz does not include Canada in his study sample, he might have found that it ranks near 
or above the United States in constitutional rigidity had he measured its amendment difficulty. The 
problem, however, would be where to start, since the Constitution of Canada entrenches five 
formal amendment procedures, each useable only in connection with specific items.62 
 
Consider first the default multilateral amendment procedure in Section 38.63 This 
procedure has been successfully used only once.64 It requires approval from both houses of 
Parliament as well as from at least two-thirds of the provinces representing at least half of the total 
provincial population.65 This procedure is expressly identified as the “general” default procedure 
to amend all provisions and principles not otherwise entrenched under one of Canada’s four other 
amendment thresholds, and it also serves as the designated threshold for specifically enumerated 
items, including provincial representation in the Senate, senatorial powers and elections, and the 
creation of new provinces.66 Under Lutz’s index, Canada’s default multilateral amendment 
procedure would score 4.50, the sum of 1.00 for parliamentary approval and 3.50 for provincial 
approval,67 good for fourth on his ranking of amendment difficulty. 
 
                                                 
Amendments to this Constitution shall be initiated by the Diet, through a concurring vote of two-
thirds or more of all the members of each House and shall thereupon be submitted to the people for 
ratification, which shall require the affirmative vote of a majority of all votes cast thereon, at a 
special referendum or at such election as the Diet shall specify. 
Amendments when so ratified shall immediately be promulgated by the Emperor in the name of the 
people, as an integral part of this Constitution.  
60
 Lutz, supra note 1, at 167-68. 
61
 Ibid. at 168. 
62
 See Constitution Act, 1982, pt. V, ss. 38-49. 
63
 Ibid. at s. 38(1): 
An amendment to the Constitution of Canada may be made by proclamation issued by the Governor 
General under the Great Seal of Canada where so authorized by (a) resolutions of the Senate and 
House of Commons; and (b) resolutions of the legislative assemblies of at least two-thirds of the 
provinces that have, in the aggregate, according to the then latest general census, at least fifty per 
cent of the population of all the provinces. 
Note that a province may in certain circumstances opt-out of an amendment adopted using the general procedure. See 
ibid. at s. 38(3). 
64
 See Constitutional Amendment Proclamation, 1983, R.S.C. 1985; see also Hogg, supra note 19 (cataloguing all 
constitutional amendments). 
65
 Ibid. at s. 38(1). 
66
 Ibid. at s. 42(1). 
67
 It is important to note that the default multilateral amendment procedure may be initiated by either of the two houses 
of Parliament or by the legislative assembly of a province. See Constitution Act, 1982, pt. V, s. 46(1). 
RICHARD ALBERT                        ALBERTA LAW REVIEW (forthcoming 2015) (peer-reviewed)                                         
10 | P a g e   .  
But Lutz’s index does not account for alternative amendment thresholds nor does it 
incorporate escalating amendment thresholds. The United States Constitution, for instance, 
entrenches an alternative amendment threshold requiring two-thirds of state legislatures to petition 
Congress to call a constitutional convention where amendments will be proposed and thereafter 
ratified by two-thirds of state legislatures.68 This alternative amendment threshold would score 
6.50 on Lutz’s scale, by far the highest of all national constitutions in his sample.69 Yet because 
the United States has never used this procedure,70 Lutz does not measure it. He instead determines 
that “we can use the lower figure unless or until the more difficulty procedure is used.”71 This 
choice obscures the possibility that the non-use of this alternative amendment threshold may itself 
be the consequence of its perceived amendment difficulty rather than simply its objective non-use. 
 
The choice to exclude alternative amendment thresholds has implications for measuring 
amendment difficulty in Canada. Like the United States, Canada entrenches alternative 
amendment thresholds, though it does so in a larger structure of escalating amendment rules, which 
assigns thresholds of increasing difficulty according to the importance of the entrenched 
constitutional provision or principle.72 Thus alongside the default multilateral amendment 
threshold, which is itself difficult to satisfy, Canada entrenches an even harder threshold requiring 
approval in both houses of Parliament and from each provincial legislature.73 This unanimity 
procedure has not once been successfully used since it was entrenched in the Constitution Act, 
1982. Political actors must satisfy this procedure to amend the most important provisions and 
principles in the Constitution of Canada, including the structure of formal amendment rules in 
Canada; the monarchy; as well as provincial representation in the House of Commons and the 
Senate, the use of English or French, and the composition of the Supreme Court of Canada, all 
three of these subject to related but lesser matters amendable by another specially designated lower 
threshold.74 On Lutz’s scale, this unanimity threshold would score 5.00 for amendment difficulty: 
the sum of 1.00 for parliamentary approval and 4.00 for unanimous provincial approval. This 
would place Canada at a very close second to the United States on Lutz’s index of difficulty. 
 
Yet the structure of Canada’s formal amendment rules is even more complicated than the 
default multilateral and unanimity procedures suggest. The escalating structure of formal 
amendment creates three more amendment thresholds, for a total of five. The Constitution of 
Canada entrenches a narrow federal unilateral amendment procedure in Section 44 authorizing 
                                                 
68
 U.S. Const., art. V. 
69
 Lutz, supra note 1, at 169. 
70
 See Fisch, supra note 2, at 490. 
71
 Lutz, supra note 1, at 169. 
72
 For an analysis of the expressive purpose of escalating amendment thresholds in Canada, see Richard Albert, “The 
Expressive Function of Constitutional Amendment Rules” (2013) 59 McGill L.J. 225 at 247-51.  
73
 Constitution Act, 1982, pt. V, s. 41: 
An amendment to the Constitution of Canada in relation to the following matters may be made by 
proclamation issued by the Governor General under the Great Seal of Canada only where authorized 
by resolutions of the Senate and House of Commons and of the legislative assembly of each 
province: (a) the office of the Queen, the Governor General and the Lieutenant Governor of a 
province; (b) the right of a province to a number of members in the House of Commons not less 
than the number of Senators by which the province is entitled to be represented at the time this Part 
comes into force; (c) subject to section 43, the use of the English or the French language; (d) the 
composition of the Supreme Court of Canada; and (e) an amendment to this Part. 
74
 Ibid. 
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Parliament to amend its internal constitution and matters of federal executive government.75 
Political actors may not use this procedure to amend matters expressly assigned to another, more 
difficult, amendment procedure.76 Since the entrenchment of the Constitution Act, 1982, this 
federal unilateral amendment procedure has been used three times.77  
 
The Constitution also entrenches a parliamentary-provincial procedure, which requires 
both houses of Parliament and the legislatures of one or more provinces affected by a given 
amendment each to agree by majority resolution to the amendment.78 This procedure may be used 
only for regional matters whose subject concerns “one or more, but not all, provinces,” for example 
an amendment relating to provincial boundaries.79 It has been used seven times, more than any 
other amendment procedure,80 and not necessarily for insignificant matters. The final amendment 
procedure authorizes provinces to use the unilateral provincial amendment procedure to formally 
amend their own constitutions, though this requires only a simple majority in the provincial 
legislature.81 Provinces may use this procedure to amend all matters related to provincial 
government that are not otherwise expressly assigned a higher amendment threshold.82 
 
It would misunderstand the study of amendment difficulty to insist that the scores of all 
five amendment thresholds must be aggregated in order to arrive at the true measure of Canada’s 
amendment difficulty. But it would also misunderstand amendment difficulty to measure only the 
highest threshold that is ever actually used in order to quantify constitutional rigidity. This 
approach would neglect the possibility that Canada’s escalating amendment thresholds are less 
complementary than competing, and that the uncertainty they generate as to which amendment 
threshold ought to be used for a particular constitutional change is itself a feature that aggravates 
amendment difficulty. Indeed, we have recently seen evidence of political actors exploiting the 
Constitution’s uncertainty as to which amendment rule applies for amendments to senatorial 
selection, choosing ultimately to pursue the lower federal unilateral amendment threshold instead 
                                                 
75
 Ibid. at s. 44 (“Subject to sections 41 and 42, Parliament may exclusively make laws amending the Constitution of 
Canada in relation to the executive government of Canada or the Senate and House of Commons.”). 
76
 Ibid. 
77
 See Fair Representation Act, S.C. 2011, c. 26; Constitution Act, 1999 (Nunavut), S.C. 1998, c. 15; Constitution Act, 
1985 (Representation), R.S.C. 1985; see also Hogg, supra note 19 (cataloguing all constitutional amendments). 
78
 Ibid. at s. 43: 
An amendment to the Constitution of Canada in relation to any provision that applies to one or more, 
but not all, provinces, including (a) any alteration to boundaries between provinces, and (b) any 
amendment to any provision that relates to the use of the English or the French language within a 
province, may be made by proclamation issued by the Governor General under the Great Seal of 
Canada only where so authorized by resolutions of the Senate and House of Commons and of the 
legislative assembly of each province to which the amendment applies. 
79
 Ibid. at s. 43. 
80
 See Constitution Amendment, 2001 (Newfoundland and Labrador), Can. Stat. Instruments SI 2002-117; 
Constitution Amendment Proclamation, 1998 (Newfoundland Act), Can. Stat. Instruments, SI 98-25; Constitution 
Amendment Proclamation, 1997 (Quebec), Can Stat. Instruments, SI 97-141; Constitution Amendment Proclamation, 
1993 (Prince Edward Island), Can. Stat. Instruments, SI 94-50; Constitution Amendment Proclamation, 1993 (New 
Brunswick Act), Can. Stat. Instruments, SI 93-54; Constitution Amendment, 1987 (Newfoundland Act), Can Stat. 
Instruments, SI 88-11; see also Hogg, supra note 19 (cataloguing all constitutional amendments). 
81
 Ibid. at s. 45 (“Subject to section 41, the legislature of each province may exclusively make laws amending the 
constitution of the province.”). 
82
 Ibid. 
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of the more onerous default multilateral amendment threshold.83 The very design of Canada’s 
formal amendment rules may therefore itself discourage political actors from pursuing 
constitutional change through the normal channels of formal amendment and instead drive them 
to seek unconventional and irregular methods of informal amendment to update the Constitution.84 
If, as I suspect, this is true, amendment complexity is a significant yet unquantifiable source of 
amendment difficulty that cannot be reflected in comparative studies of constitutional rigidity. 
III. EXTRA-TEXTUAL AMENDMENT RULES IN CANADA 
 
As onerous as Canada’s formal amendment rules may be—and history has shown just how 
difficult they are to satisfy85—the difficulty of formal amendment in Canada derives equally from 
sources external to those textual rules. Major constitutional amendments to fundamental features 
of the polity or Canadian identity, or to the framework of government or federal-provincial 
relations, all matters that Peter Russell defines generally as “mega constitutional politics,”86 also 
require conformity with extra-textual requirements imposed by Supreme Court decisions, 
parliamentary and provincial statutes, and arguably also by constitutional convention. Many 
though not all of these extra-textual rules for formally amending the Constitution of Canada trace 
their impetus to legitimate concerns for protecting minority rights in connection with Quebec.87 
When layered onto the existing formal amendment rules, these additional non-textual rules may 
well make major constitutional amendment impossible today in Canada. 
                                                 
83
 See Albert, “Constructive Unamendability in Canada and the United States”, supra note 24, at 211-15. 
84
 See Albert, “Constitutional Amendment by Stealth”, supra note 24 (arguing that political actors have sought to 
circumvent the onerous formal amendment rules by creating a constitutional convention that will bind their successors 
functionally in much the same way as a formal amendment). A Supreme Court reference finally clarified which 
amendment threshold applies. See Reference re Senate Reform, 2014 SCC 32 (2014) [“Senate Reference”]. 
85
 For a discussion of the failures of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords, see Michael B. Stein, “Improving 
the Process of Constitutional Reform in Canada: Lessons from the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Constitutional 
Rounds” (1997) 30 Can. J. Pol. Sci. 307 at 315-29. We should not attribute the failure of the Meech Lake and 
Charlottetown Accords only to the difficulty of formal amendment in Canada. This is certainly a principal reason for 
the failure of both efforts. But we must distinguish the difficulty of formal amendment from the design of the 
amendment proposals themselves. The failure of both the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords is equally 
attributable to the choice of political actors to present their proposed amendments in an omnibus package for wholesale 
constitutional renewal. The many components in each of the Accords made it difficult to secure widespread agreement 
from the various political actors across the country whose support was required under the rules of formal amendment. 
Here is one of the most useful explanations for the failure of the Charlottetown Accord: 
The package Canadians rejected was formidably complex. It became so by a decade’s accretion of 
elements, each calculated to appeal to, or to offset concessions to, groups excluded at an earlier 
stage—Quebec, the western provinces, and aboriginal peoples. Negotiators hoped that by 1992 they 
had finally found an equilibrium, a logroll sufficiently inclusive to survive referral to the people. 
Instead they seem to have gotten the logic of the logroll upside down: they may have overestimated 
both how much each group wanted what it got and how intensely some groups opposed key 
concessions to others. 
Richard Johnston, “An Inverted Logroll: The Charlottetown Accord and the Referendum” (1993) 26 Pol. Sci. & Pol. 
43 at 43. 
86
 See Peter H. Russell, Constitutional Odyssey: Can Canadians Become a Sovereign People? (University of Toronto 
Press 1992) 75. 
87
 Indeed, the protection of minority rights is also in many instances the reason why this phenomenon arises elsewhere 
in the democratic world. I am grateful to Jim Repetti for drawing my attention to this important point. 
RICHARD ALBERT                        ALBERTA LAW REVIEW (forthcoming 2015) (peer-reviewed)                                         
13 | P a g e   .  
A. Statutory Conditions  
 
Parliamentary and provincial statutes have exacerbated formal amendment difficulty.88 At 
the federal level, Parliament passed the Regional Veto law in 1996.89 The law, just an ordinary 
statute passed without recourse to the rules of formal amendment, made good on a federal promise 
to grant Quebec more powers, including a veto in major constitutional amendment. The promise 
was conditioned on Quebec rejecting secession in the 1995 referendum,90 which it did, though 
only by a slight margin.91 Under the Regional Veto law, Quebec possesses a veto on major 
constitutional amendments proposed pursuant to the default multilateral amendment procedure in 
Section 38. But the veto is not exclusive: the law grants the same veto power to the other regions 
of Canada, some of which are defined as provinces and others as provincial groupings: the Atlantic 
and Prairie provinces, Ontario, and British Columbia.92  
 
The Regional Veto Law applies narrowly only to major amendment proposals under 
Section 38. The reason why is that among the five constitutionally-entrenched amendment 
thresholds, Section 38 is the only one implicating federal-provincial relations that does not 
currently authorize a provincial veto.93 The key to the Regional Veto Law is that it constrains the 
conduct of only federal cabinet ministers. The law does not expressly grant the designated regions 
a formal veto but it does give them a special protection that amounts to a functional veto: federal 
cabinet ministers may not propose a constitutional amendment under Section 38 without first 
securing the consent of a majority of provinces—a majority that must include Quebec, Ontario, 
British Columbia and at least two each of the Atlantic and Prairie provinces representing at least 
half of the regional population.94 Scholars have calculated that the provincial population 
distribution in the Prairie provinces results in granting an effective veto to Alberta as well.95 All 
other provinces beyond Quebec, Ontario British Columbia and Alberta may exercise a veto over 
major constitutional amendment proposals, but only in tandem with other regional allies that can 
combine with them to achieve a statutorily-required population threshold.96  
 
The Regional Veto law is an ordinary statute but its effect is extraordinary. It appears only 
to require federal-provincial consultation but it actually creates a significant barrier to formal 
amendment that now makes it even more unlikely that a major amendment will ever succeed. The 
                                                 
88
 Below, in connection with the Secession Reference, I also discuss the Clarity Act as an example of a parliamentary 
statute that has exacerbated amendment difficulty. See infra Section III.C. 
89
 An Act Respecting Constitutional Amendments, S.C. 1996, c. 1 (1996) [“Regional Veto law”]. 
90
 See Robert A. Young, “Jean Chretien’s Quebec Legacy: Coasting then Stickhandling Hard” (2004) 9 Rev. Const. 
Stud. 31 at 38-39. 
91
 The result of the referendum was close, with 2,362,648 voting to reject secession and 2,308,360 voting in favour. 
The participation rate was 93.52%. See Elections Quebec, “Référendums au Québec’ online: 
http://www.electionsquebec.qc.ca/francais/tableaux/referendums-quebec-8484.php (last accessed November 1, 
2014). 
92
 Regional Veto Law, supra note 88, at s. 1(1). 
93
 Section 41 (requiring unanimous provincial agreement) and section 43 (requiring the agreement of affected 
province(s)) both effectively grant provinces a veto. Neither section 44 nor section 45 concern federal-provincial 
matters. 
94
 Ibid. 
95
 Andrew Heard & Tim Swartz, “The Regional Veto Formula and its Effects on Canada’s Constitutional Amendment 
Process” (1997) 30 Can. J. Pol. Sci. 339 at 342-43. 
96
 See Greene, supra note 20, at 263-64. 
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prohibition on cabinet ministers proposing a Section 38 amendment without provincial consent 
establishes a prior restraint not otherwise contemplated by the Constitution of Canada.97 In the 
past, the federal government could have introduced an amendment proposal in Parliament, and 
perhaps through debate and deliberation could have cobbled together the requisite parliamentary 
majority, and in doing so could have drawn provincial allies to its side as the amendment project 
grew in popularity. Now, however, the federal government must recruit provincial allies prior to 
even proposing an amendment in Parliament, reversing the order envisioned by the formal 
amendment rules and short-circuiting the amendment process before it ever begins. This statutory 
complication to the Constitution’s formal amendment process has given rise, correctly in my view, 
to a non-trivial argument that the Regional Veto Law is unconstitutional.98 
 
Provinces have likewise adopted their own laws that further constrain major constitutional 
amendment. These provincial laws now require either a binding or advisory province-wide 
referendum on any formal amendment for which provincial ratification is required.99 For example, 
Alberta requires a binding provincial referendum before the provincial legislature votes to ratify a 
major amendment requiring provincial ratification.100 British Columbia similarly prevents the 
provincial legislature from ratifying a formal amendment unless a binding province-wide 
referendum first authorizes the legislature to ratify it.101 Other provinces and territories, including 
New Brunswick, Saskatchewan and Yukon, authorize but do not require their governments to hold 
binding referenda before voting to ratify or reject an amendment.102 Still others, like the Northwest 
Territories, Nunavut, Quebec, Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland & Labrador, authorize but 
do not require an advisory referendum or plebiscite prior to a legislative vote on ratification.103 
 
These provincial referenda laws are problematic for formal amendment in Canada.104 They 
too operate as a prior restraint to legislative decision-making. Under Canada’s formal amendment 
rules, provinces are authorized to vote to ratify major amendments proposed by Parliament. The 
Constitution requires no intervening decision or action between parliamentary proposal and 
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 See David E. Smith, “The Canadian Senate: What is to be Done?” in Peter H. Russell, ed., Essential Readings in 
Canadian Constitutional Politics (Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 2011) at 43. 
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 See Heard & Swartz, supra note 95, at 340-41. 
99
 C.E.S. Franks, “A Continuing Canadian Conundrum: The Role of Parliament in Questions of National Unity and 
the Processes of Amending the Constitution” in J. Peter Meekison et al., eds., Reconsidering the Institution of 
Canadian Federalism (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004) 35 at 44. 
100
 Rev. Stat. Alb. 2000, C-25, ss. 2(1), 4. 
101
 Rev. Stat. B.C. 1996, C-67, s. 1; Rev. Stat. B.C. 1996, C-400, s. 4. 
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 See Referendum Act, S.N.B. 2011, c. 23, ss. 12-13 (New Brunswick) (establishing quorum requirement for vote to 
bind government); The Referendum and Plebiscite Act, Stat. Sask. 1990-91, c R-8.01, s. 4 (Saskatchewan) 
(establishing quorum and threshold requirements for vote to bind government); Public Government Act, Stat. Yuk. 
1992, c-10, s. 7 (Yukon) (authoring legislature to decide ex ante whether referendum vote will bind government). 
103
 See, e.g., Consolidation of Plebiscite Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1998, c. P-8, s. 5 (Nunavut); Elections and Plebiscites Act, 
S.NW.T. 2006, c. 15, s. 48 (Northwest Territories); La Loi sur la consultation populaire, L.R.Q. 2000, c. C-64.1, s. 7 
(Quebec); Plebiscites Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1991, c.32, s. 1 (Prince Edward Island); see also Elections Act, S.N.L. 1992, c. 
E-3.1, s. 218 (Newfoundland & Labrador) (authorizing non-binding plebiscite on federal amendment). 
104
 Citizens in the United States have tried unsuccessfully to exercise the power to instruct their legislators how to vote 
on a formal amendment proposal. Courts have ruled these efforts unconstitutional for encroaching on the power of 
elected representatives to deliberate on the fate of an amendment. See Keith P. Miller, Direct Democracy and the 
Courts (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 171-72; Kris W. Kobach, “May ‘We the People’ 
Speak?: The Forgotten Role of Constituent Instructions in Amending the Constitution” (1999) 33 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 
1 at 7-9. 
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provincial legislative vote. Yet many provinces have chosen to insert a provincial referendum, 
either binding or advisory, before their legislature is even authorized to vote on a parliamentary 
proposal to amend the Constitution. On one hand, it is politically prudent for provincial political 
actors to consult their constituents on a major amendment proposal before they take action on it. 
On the other, the Constitution of Canada does not require this step, and it further delays the 
provincial decision on a proposal which is subject to a strict three-year time limit for ratification.105 
 
Both of these extra-textual statutory conditions—conformity with the Regional Veto law 
and with provincial referendum laws—impose formal amendment conditions over and above those 
required by Canada’s formal amendment rules. None of the constitutionally-entrenched rules 
suggests a veto power for any province. (Indeed, Canada rejected an explicit provincial veto power 
over constitutional amendment in both the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords.106) Nor do 
any of Canada’s formal amendment rules recognize the validity of a referendum at any level of 
government, whether federal or provincial, in the amendment process. Although Canada has a long 
history of provincial referenda, none of the five formal amendment thresholds requires nor 
suggests a provincial referendum in either the proposal or ratification of a major constitutional 
amendment. Yet today many provincial referendum laws are now binding as a matter of statutory 
law on provincial political actors. The consequence of the Regional Veto law and provincial 
referendum laws is that federal and provincial political actors must now govern themselves 
according to statutory rules beyond those the constitution imposes on them.  
 
This threatens to erode the distinction between the Constitution of Canada and a statute 
that is supposed to be inferior to it. What makes the Constitution a constitution is that it enjoys a 
higher status relative to a statute, that it is more difficult to amend than a statute, and that a statute 
is derivative of the Constitution.107 These parliamentary and provincial statutes on constitutional 
amendment have effectively modified the Constitution’s rules for formal amendment. They 
moreover aspire to constitutional or quasi-constitutional status insofar as they are meant to bind 
political actors in the process of constitutional amendment in the same way the Constitution does. 
The problem, however, is that these parliamentary and provincial statutes have not earned their 
special status through the channels the Constitution requires for achieving constitutional status. 
They are mere statutes that purport to bind political actors as authoritatively as the Constitution, 
when really the opposite is true: the Constitution requires these statutes first to be valid constraints. 
 
Returning to Lutz’s index of amendment difficulty, it is hard to quantify how much more 
difficult the Regional Veto law and the provincial laws make formal amendment in Canada. Lutz 
does not provide specifically for the kind of pre-initiation approval the Regional Veto law requires, 
nor does he contemplate the possibility of pre-ratification provincial referenda, whether binding 
or consultative. But we may nonetheless approximate the relative value of each of these additional 
steps using Lutz’s index of 68 possible actions that may in some combination be deployed in 
constitutional amendment. On his scale, the pre-initiation approval required by the Regional Veto 
law is comparable to the requirement of multiple state legislative approval, which counts for 
                                                 
105
 See Constitution Act, 1982, pt. V, s. 39(2) (creating a three-year time limit to ratify an amendment proposal).  
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 See Meech Lake Accord, supra note 10; Charlottetown Accord, supra note 10. 
107
 Donald S. Lutz, “Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment” in Sanford Levinson, ed., supra note 22, 237 at 
240; András Sajó, Limiting Government: An Introduction to Constitutionalism (Budapest, Hungary: Central 
University Press, 1999) at 39-40; Schneier, supra note 31, at 222. 
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2.00.108 The pre-ratification provincial referenda are comparable to a series of popular referenda, 
valued on Lutz’s scale at 1.50.109 When added to the score for amendment difficulty assigned to 
Canada’s general amendment threshold (4.50), these two new requirements raise Canada’s score 
to 8.00, which exceeds the score for even the as-yet unused national convention path (6.50) 
assigned to the United States Constitution.110 
B. Popular Expectations  
 
Quite apart from these legislative constraints on constitutional change, formal amendment 
must now arguably also conform to popular expectations of increased participation.111 It is 
possible, though far from clear,112 that there now exists a constitutional convention requiring a 
national consultative referendum before ratifying any major constitutional amendment. This 
convention derives from the decision to submit the 1992 Charlottetown Accord to a national 
referendum, even though the text of Canada’s formal amendment rules did not then, nor do they 
now, require a referendum as a condition of successfully ratifying a constitutional amendment.113   
 
Here, I am using “constitutional convention” in contrast to its use elsewhere in this Article 
in connection with  the as-yet unused procedure for amending the United States Constitution by 
“constitutional convention,” a reference to an assembly of political actors that convenes to write 
or amend a constitution. In the sense in which I refer to the concept in connection with Canada, 
constitutional conventions are the body of understandings and norms that regulate the conduct of 
political actors.114 Common law courts generally do not enforce constitutional conventions but 
they do recognize them, as the Supreme Court of Canada did in the Patriation Reference when it 
recognized the existence of a convention of substantial provincial consent for major constitutional 
amendments.115 A constitutional convention is not a legal rule since it does not emerge from either 
the judicial or lawmaking process; it is better described as a rule of political morality because its 
content is determined by the action, agreement and/or the acquiescence of political actors.116 At 
bottom, a constitutional convention “ultimately reflect[s] what people do.”117 Constitutional 
conventions bind political actors only inasmuch as they can neither arise nor change by unilateral 
action; they require multilateral and cross-party ratification in order to arise and survive.118  
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The Charlottetown Accord was Canada’s second major attempt, following the failed 
Meech Lake Accord in 1987, to address the matters left unresolved in the Constitution Act, 1982, 
such as the special status of Quebec, the rights of First Nations, and the modernization of national 
institutions.119 In response to the perception and indeed the reality that the Meech Lake Accord 
had been the result of a closed-door, back-room and elite-driven drafting process,120 political actors 
chose to open the Charlottetown process to public input, transparent deliberation, and ultimately 
national referendal consultation as a way to signal their commitment to make the new document 
Canadians’ own.121 The national referendal consultation was authorized by a parliamentary law, 
the Referendum Act which made it legally permissible and administratively possible to survey 
Canadians on “any question relating to the Constitution of Canada.”122 The referendum question 
was straightforward: “Do you agree that the Constitution of Canada should be renewed on the 
basis of the [Charlottetown Accord]?”123 Voters rejected the Accord by 54.3 to 45.7 percent.124 
 
The extraordinary use of a national referendum in the Charlottetown process has prompted 
observers to suggest that future similar efforts should also incorporate a national referendum.125 
The theory here is that the Charlottetown referendum has matured into a constitutional convention. 
The dominant view is that the Charlottetown referendum has set a “binding precedent”126 that is 
“a fact of constitutional reform in Canada now” requiring public ratification for major, though not 
minor, constitutional reforms.127 The failure to enlist voters in a referendum on any future 
constitutional reform on the scale of the Charlottetown Accord “is likely to be perceived as 
illegitimate.”128 The prevailing view is that the days of closed-door, back-room and elite-driven 
constitution-making and -change are gone, and political actors must now attend to public inclusion 
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through consultation and ratification when engaging in major efforts for constitutional renewal.129 
There are some arguments to the contrary but they are squarely within the minority camp. For 
example, one scholar has argued that the lesson of the 1992 Charlottetown referendum is that it 
will be important to provide for popular involvement in some fashion in future efforts at major 
constitutional renewal though not necessarily in the form of referendal consultation.130 Another 
has suggested that the referendum may have created a precedent but that this precedent has not 
yet, nor might it ever become, a constitutional convention.131 
 
Referendal consultation is of course not formally a condition of successful amendment in 
Canada.132 But if it is true that a convention has taken root now requiring a national referendum 
before a major amendment to the Constitution of Canada becomes valid, this will significantly 
increase Canada’s formal amendment difficulty. Procedurally, this would mean that a major formal 
amendment pursuant to the unanimity threshold in Section 41 would now require the following 
steps: (1) majority resolutions in both houses of Parliament; (2) separate referenda in the provinces 
and territories;133 and (3) unanimous legislative ratification by each of the provinces and territories. 
Under Lutz’s index of amendment difficulty, this amendment procedure would score 6.50, the sum 
of the value of Canada’s unanimity threshold (5.00) and the use of a popular referendum for 
ratification (1.50).134 This score of amendment difficulty exceeds the score assigned to the United 
States Constitution (5.10) and matches its score under the unused convention process (6.50). 
 
There is a further point worth noting in connection with the new popular expectations of 
participation in constitutional amendment. In the aftermath of the Charlottetown referendum, the 
territories may now expect to play a formal role in a future major constitutional amendment. There 
were only two territories at the time of the Charlottetown referendum: the Northwest Territories 
and Yukon. Both participated in the referendum as partners equal to the provinces.135 The 
Referendum Act pursuant to which the national referendal consultation on the Charlottetown 
Accord had been organized authorized voters in all of Canada’s electoral districts, whether in a 
province or a territory, to cast a ballot.136 Yet Canada’s formal amendment rules made no provision 
then for territorial participation in constitutional amendment, nor do they now. Today, as of 1999, 
Nunavut is Canada’s third territory.137 The 1992 Charlottetown referendum, in which Canada’s 
territories occupied a role equal to the provinces’ own in the referendal consultation, may be seen 
as a precedent that will in the future compel a continuing role for Canada’s three territories in 
major constitutional amendments. This, too, will further complicate formal amendment in Canada.  
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C. Judicial Standards  
 
In addition to new restrictions on formal amendment established by statute and possibly 
also by constitutional convention, the Supreme Court of Canada has further exacerbated formal 
amendment difficulty in its interpretation of the Constitution of Canada.138 In both the Supreme 
Court Act139 and Secession References,140 the Court informally modified the textually entrenched 
requirements to amend the Constitution, and in so doing has not only made it more difficult to 
amend certain elements of the Constitution of Canada but, even more controversially, it may have 
also reserved to itself the power to resolve questions on the constitutionality of future amendments. 
 
Begin with the Supreme Court Act Reference, a matter concerning which amendment 
threshold applies to amendments to the Supreme Court of Canada. The Court declared that its own 
essential features—specifically “the Court’s jurisdiction as the final general court of appeal for 
Canada, including in matters of constitutional interpretation, and its independence”141—cannot be 
amended outside of the unanimity procedure.142 On one hand, the Court’s interpretation clarifies 
an uncertainty in the text: whether the Court’s essential features are amendable pursuant either to 
the default multilateral amendment procedure or the unanimity procedure. On the other, the 
Court’s interpretation is not mandated by the constitutional text, which states only that 
amendments to “the composition of the Supreme Court of Canada”143 shall require conformity 
with the unanimity threshold and that most other amendments to the Court must satisfy the lower 
default multilateral amendment procedure.144  
 
In terms of amendment difficulty, the skeptical reading of the Supreme Court Act 
Reference suggests that the Court has made it even harder for political actors to make amendments 
to the Court’s essential features. The strongest evidence of this newly-imposed hyper-difficulty of 
formal amendment is apparent in the Supreme Court Act Reference itself, where the Court chose 
against to defining these essential features with any precision, but rather only to say what they 
include “at the very least,”145 and thereby reserve to itself the power to define further elements of 
its essential features in future matters. On this view, the Court has not only insulated itself from 
future formal amendments to features beyond only its “composition,” but also to its very nature as 
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a judicial body. And where disputes arise as to whether an amendment concerns something 
requiring either the unanimity or default multilateral amendment procedure, the Court will be the 
one to decide which rule governs. As any institution would do in the interest of its self-
preservation, the Court is likely to choose the harder amendment procedure for political actors to 
make changes to it. 
 
The Secession Reference is similar in the sense that the Court reached beyond the text of 
the Constitution to uncover limitations on the power of formal amendment. The Court held that a 
formal amendment in connection with a provincial secession from Canada must be governed by 
the duty to negotiate as well as “underlying constitutional principles,” including federalism, 
democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, and respect for minority rights.146 These 
principles are not stated in the text of Canada’s formal amendment rules, nor are they expressly 
identified anywhere but in the Court’s Reference as the principles that must govern secession. 
Whether they correctly reflect Canada’s constitutional traditions, and they very well might, is not 
the relevant question.147 It is rather that the Court departed from the Constitution’s complete 
codification of formal amendment rules to entrench previously unwritten rules for formal 
amendment. A formal amendment in connection with secession must now respect these rules.148 
 
Formal amendment in connection with secession must now also respect the terms of the 
Clarity Act, which Parliament passed in 2000, two years after the Court’s Secession Reference.149 
In its preamble, the Clarity Act conveys Parliament’s interpretation of the Secession Reference, 
specifically that the Court “confirmed that, in Canada, the secession of a province, to be lawful 
would require an amendment to the Constitution of Canada” and that the negotiations leading to 
formalizing the secession of a province “would be governed by the principles of federalism, 
democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, and the protection of minorities”.150 The Clarity 
Act creates rules for Parliament to deliberate on the clarity of a referendum question to be posed 
to voters in a province. Those rules concern many aspects of a referendal vote on secession, 
including the timing of parliamentary deliberations,151 the types of questions to be posed in the 
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referendum,152 the need to consider views in the province apart from those of the party proposing 
the referendum,153 and the criteria for evaluating the sufficiency of the expressed will to secede.154 
Like the Regional Veto Law, the Clarity Act is an ordinary statute passed without recourse 
to the rules of formal amendment. Yet its effect extends further than an ordinary statute because it 
is designed to impose constraints on constitutional amendment beyond those entrenched in the 
constitutional text. The most important constraint in this respect is the Clarity Act’s prohibition on 
any Minister of the Crown proposing a constitutional amendment to effect the secession of a 
province unless the Government of Canada has first negotiated a number of items in connection 
with the secession, including the division of assets and liabilities, provincial borders, the interests 
and claims of First Nations, and the protection of minority rights.155 These are of course reasonable 
expectations from political actors engaged in negotiating a provincial secession. But it is important 
to recognize that these momentous changes to the Constitution of Canada—how it can be amended, 
who can amend it and when, and what rules limit the amendment process itself—were made by an 
ordinary statute. The Clarity Act must be understood for what it is: an ordinary statute that has 
informally modified the Constitution’s formal amendment rules, as did the Regional Veto Law.156 
There is no verifiable way to quantify the difficulty that these new interpretive standards 
now add to the larger scheme of formal amendment in Canada. They will certainly make it more 
difficult to amend matters related to the Court and to provincial secession. The suitability of the 
amendment procedures and the constitutionality of an amendment itself will now be judged by the 
Court as the ultimate arbiter of the constitutionality of amendments in these domains, and perhaps 
in others still to be identified by the Court itself.157 It is of course not unusual in a constitutional 
democracy for a court to possess the power to invalidate a constitutional amendment as 
unconstitutional. We have seen courts in Germany, India, South Africa and Turkey among others 
assert variations on this power,158 and courts around the world are trending toward adopting a 
doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendment.159 But this immense power nonetheless 
raises questions of democratic legitimacy where the Court strikes down an amendment that has 
satisfied the formal strictures entrenched in the Constitution on the basis of unwritten principles 
that can be identified and interpreted only by the reviewing Court.160 
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IV. CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONALISM AND FORMAL AMENDMENT 
 
Amending the Constitution of Canada is therefore much harder than its text suggests. The 
dialogic interactions of Canadian political actors have given rise to extra-textual rules over and 
above the already onerous formal amendment rules entrenched in the Constitution Act, 1982.161 
These formal and extra-textual rules make the Constitution exceedingly rigid, perhaps even more 
resistant to alteration than the United States Constitution, long believed by scholars to be among 
the world’s most difficult democratic constitutions to amend.162 The near-impossibility of formal 
amendment raises serious problems related both to participatory democracy as well as the 
legitimacy of extra-textual limitations on the amendment power. In this Part, I will suggest that 
extreme amendment difficulty is problematic because it burdens the democratic and deliberative 
purposes of formal amendment. I will also suggest that the extra-textual foundations of Canada’s 
extreme amendment difficulty risk undermining Canadian constitutionalism and the rule of law. 
A. Democracy and Amendment 
 
Where a constitution is difficult to amend, the consequence is to barricade the provisions 
entrenched by the authoring generation. Amendment difficulty privileges the status quo and 
reinforces the values and vision of those whose voice prevailed in creating the constitution. 
Constitutional designers that are either too sure of themselves or too distrusting of their successors 
therefore sometimes choose to entrench provisions against formal amendment altogether, making 
them formally unamendable.163 A constitutional provision is unamendable where no measure of 
legislative or popular agreement, not even unanimity, is sufficient to authorize a formal 
amendment to it.164 For example, the German Basic Law makes “human dignity” formally 
unamendable,165 the Italian Constitution declares that republicanism “shall not be a matter for 
constitutional amendment,”166 and the Turkish Constitution states that secularism “shall not be 
amended, nor shall [its] amendment be proposed.”167 Constitutional designers entrench 
unamendable provisions like these often to commit their successors to respecting the values they 
have chosen to privilege with this design strategy.168 
 
Unamendability has become an increasingly common feature in modern constitutions. 
Over half of the world’s new constitutions from 1989 to 2013 entrenched an unamendable 
provision, as compared to roughly one quarter of those constitutions enacted between 1945 and 
1988, and fewer than 1 in 5 of all constitutions created between 1789 and 1944.169 But 
unamendability need not be formalized in the constitutional text. It can arise informally where the 
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political climate makes it practically impossible, though nonetheless always theoretically possible, 
to gather the required supermajorities necessary to formally amend the constitution. This kind of 
“constructive” unamendability derives from deep divisions among political actors, an inhospitable 
political climate for formal amendment, and alternatively or in addition from the structural design 
of the constitution, each of which can lead to stalemate in formal amendment.170 Even without the 
extra-textual restrictions imposed on formal amendment, the Constitution of Canada as written is 
today constructively unamendable on matters requiring the default or unanimity procedure, 
scholars having described formal amendment as virtually impossible for those reasons.171 The 
constructive unamendability of the Constitution of Canada now entrenches the vision of the 
Constitution’s authors more rigidly than even the authors themselves had imagined possible. 
 
The same critiques apply equally to formal as to constructive unamendability. The result 
in either case is to take a given constitutional provision off the amendment table, and to thereby 
place it beyond the reach of formal amendment. This has more than theoretical costs. Disabling 
the formal amendment process has real consequences for political actors and the people they 
represent because it prevents anyone but the drafting generation from seeing its values reflected in 
the text of the constitution. This manifests itself in several ways. Unamendability denies political 
actors and the people the capacity for deliberative engagement with the constitutional text and the 
possibility of adapting the text to modern sensibilities.172 Unamendability as a constitutional form 
moreover overlooks the possibility that the constitution as designed and as interpreted may be 
imperfect and even unjust.173 No Constitution illustrates this point more clearly than the United 
States Constitution, which originally entrenched the slave trade as formally unamendable until 
1808, twenty years after the Constitution’s coming-into-force in 1789.174 Had the slave trade been 
indefinitely formally unamendable, American history may have unfolded differently.  
B. The Weakening of Writtenness 
 
Unamendability has undermined the democratic foundations of formal amendment. When 
formal amendment rules first appeared in constitutions, their purpose was to make possible an 
informed and deliberative judgment to improve the text when time and experience revealed 
faults.175 The very nature of a mature polity governed by a written document required then and 
still today that political actors have the capacity to keep the constitutional text aligned with the 
evolving norms and views of the people it is intended to govern.176 Unamendability has since 
eroded some of the envisioned virtue of formal amendment rules, disabling them, if even as to 
only a discrete range of constitutional provisions, and denying them their intended function.  
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But there is another more important sense in which amendment difficulty specifically in 
Canada has weakened writtenness. Beyond the constructive unamendability of the Constitution of 
Canada as a result of the difficulty of satisfying its formal amendment rules for major changes, the 
extra-textual restrictions imposed by parliamentary and provincial statutes, judicial decisions and 
constitutional conventions have transformed the written constitution into an incomplete code for 
the accomplishment of a task that is by definition rooted in textual authority. Yet Canada’s formal 
amendment rules were entrenched as a complete code for altering the constitutional text, with each 
of the five amendment thresholds designed to occupy the entire field of amendment possibilities.  
 
Inquiring into the history of the design of Canada’s formal amendment rules illuminates 
their intended purpose. Of course, we should not today feel bound by the motivations of the 
authoring generation but it is nonetheless important to understand the objectives for which 
Canada’s formal amendment rules were created to begin with. At Confederation, the British North 
America Act, 1867 (since renamed the Constitution Act, 1867),177 authorized only the Parliament 
of the United Kingdom to formally amend the Constitution of Canada,178 with the exception that 
an individual province could amend its own provincial constitution.179 The Parliament of Canada 
was ultimately given a narrow amendment power comparable to the narrow provincial authority 
in formal amendment: Parliament became authorized to amend only those purely federal subjects 
under Parliament’s purview,180 a power analogous to a province’s authority to amend only those 
subjects of purely provincial concern within its jurisdiction. Over time, there developed an 
expectation that all other amendments were possible only by recourse to the Parliament of the 
United Kingdom at the request of a joint resolution of the House of Commons and the Senate.181  
 
An important question arose, however, as to what degree of provincial consent was needed 
for an amendment affecting federal-provincial relations. Political actors disagreed on this question, 
and it was not until the Patriation Reference that the Supreme Court helped accelerate a resolution 
to the impasse. The Court recognized that a convention of substantial provincial consent to 
amendments on federal-provincial relations had matured over the many decades of constitutional 
practice without any textual referent that had established any particular amendment rule.182 An 
evaluation of prior constitutional practice had shown that, between Confederation and 1964, there 
had been sixteen instances of formal amendment to the Constitution of Canada, ten of which had 
been exclusively federal in nature.183 As to the remaining six, each affected federal-provincial 
relations, and in each case the federal government had consulted with the concerned provinces and 
secured unanimous provincial consent in all but one instance.184 The Court therefore held that 
political actors were bound by this convention, which did not hold the force of law, to respect the 
established norms of constitutional practice to make a major constitutional amendment.185 
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When political actors ultimately agreed to the formal amendment rules entrenched in the 
Constitution Act, 1982, they had been repeating an old exercise, which had failed each time before, 
to create procedures for formal amendments that would concern neither the provinces nor the 
federal government alone. A study of the interprovincial and parliamentary conference debates on 
the design of Canada’s formal amendment rules from the 1920s through their eventual 
entrenchment in 1982 demonstrates that the objective in creating a home-grown framework of 
formal amendment rules was to create amendment procedures that would cover every aspect of 
formal constitutional change. From procedures for amendments to only intraprovincial matters, to 
those for matters purely internal to the operation of Parliament, and to procedures requiring varying 
degrees of interprovincial negotiation, a central purpose for creating the escalating structure of 
formal amendment in Canada was to provide that every conceivable category of amendment would 
be assigned to a specific formal amendment procedure. The reason was plain: to in the future avert 
the possibility of ambiguity and stalemate that had led to the Patriation Reference.186 I am currently 
developing a more detailed study of the history of the design of Canada’s formal amendment rules 
in which I will demonstrate this point with reference to archival records of the interprovincial and 
parliamentary conference debates through which the formal amendment rules were developed.187 
When read in light of the history of the design of Canada’s formal amendment rules, these 
new extra-textual restrictions imposed by judicial interpretation, by parliamentary and provincial 
as well as territorial laws and by constitutional convention undermine the entrenchment of 
Canada’s escalating structure of formal amendment rules and indeed the very purpose of 
writtenness. It is of course true that no constitution is itself as a matter of fact nor does it purport 
as a matter of reasonable self-description to be an exhaustive catalogue of all applicable rules.188 
Written constitutions must be supplemented by unwritten constitutional norms that fill some of the 
gaps in the constitutional text or that are so fundamental that they need not be entrenched in 
writing.189 These norms operate as an obligation to act in a way unreflected in the constitutional 
text but nonetheless still valid. Conventional obligations develop where there are precedents that 
validate the obligation, political actors feel themselves bound by those precedents, and where there 
is a valid reason motivating political actors to respect the precedent.190 This much is 
uncontroversial, and it explains why political actors obey rules outside the master-text constitution. 
186
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C. Formal Amendment Rules and the Value of Writtenness 
 
But formal amendment rules are different from other entrenched constitutional rules. 
Formal amendment rules constitute the “supreme criterion of law” in regimes where a new 
provision adopted according to formal procedures and subsequently entrenched in the master-text 
constitution takes priority over all prior law to the extent of any discovered or intended 
incompatibility.191 As the gatekeepers to the constitutional text, formal amendment rules police 
both the “rules of the game in a society” as well as the “rules for changing the rules.”192 No part 
of a constitution is more important than formal amendment rules,193 largely because they “define 
the conditions under which all other constitutional norms may be legally displaced.”194 The very 
entrenchment and authorized use of formal amendment rules reflect the core democratic values we 
associate with the rule of law, namely transparency, predictability and accountability.195 Only 
where the law and the rules by which it is changed are known and publicized, stable and precise, 
and moreover created in a monitorable process according to pre-established rules may we cultivate 
a constitutional culture where the text actually matters and is also perceived as mattering.196 
 
On this view, extra-textual restrictions on formal amendment in Canada are problematic 
for the rule of law. Their effect, functionally though not in form, is to alter the requirements to 
formally amend the Constitution of Canada. This is problematic in two principal ways. First, it 
creates uncertainty where none once existed: the five detailed rules of formal amendment are now 
revealed as stating only the necessary but insufficient conditions to amend the Constitution, 
contrary to the very purpose of entrenching formal amendment rules to begin with. They are 
supposed to constitute a complete code for altering the constitutional text. Yet they have been 
modified extra-textually to require criteria unknown and unspecified in the constitutional text, 
thereby changing the terms of the bargain struck among the parties to the Constitution Act, 1982 
in defiance of our expectation of transparent and collective authorship that writtenness entails.197 
That today these extra-textual restrictions have changed the rules of formal amendment suggests 
that more, fewer or different restrictions may be established by the future judgments of political 
actors, thereby breeding doubt about the text and whether it may be read as expressing a reliable 
standard for the conduct of political actors in the process of formal amendment. 
 
Second, these extra-textual limits on formal amendment result in changing Canada’s 
formal amendment rules themselves without meeting the required threshold for their amendment. 
Section 41 of the Constitution Act, 1982 mandates that “any amendment” to the requirements of 
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formal amendment must fulfill the requirements of the unanimity procedure.198 One could certainly 
argue that these extra-textual restrictions do not constitute an “amendment” to Canada’s formal 
amendment rules insofar as they do not alter the text of the Constitution. On narrow textualist 
grounds, this would defeat the claim that validating these new extra-textual limits requires a formal 
amendment. But it would fail to appreciate the extent to which political actors may perceive these 
new extra-textual restrictions as binding upon them and their successors, in which case the 
difference between formal and informal amendment matters very little on functional grounds.  
 
The better argument, in my view, is that these extra-textual restrictions constitute 
modifications to Canada’s formal amendment rules. The democratic values of the rule of law—
transparency, predictability and accountability—counsel that political actors should either 
incorporate these restrictions into the constitutional text by validating them through the procedures 
required by Section 41 or alternatively declare that those extra-textual rules are not binding upon 
them or their successors in future attempts to formally amend the Constitution of Canada. Both 
options are suboptimal, the former with respect to the reality of formal amendment and the latter 
because political actors are unlikely to find it profitable to declare those rules non-binding. Formal 
amendment in Canada is difficult if not impossible, so it is unlikely that Canada’s formal 
amendment rules will be formally amended to reflect the new extra-textual restrictions.  
 
The alternative, then, may be to treat the new extra-textual restrictions as either 
inapplicable or illegitimate. This would mean interpreting the Charlottetown referendal experience 
as informing future efforts at major constitutional amendment though not as binding. It would also 
mean rethinking the validity of the Regional Veto Law, the Clarity Act, as well as the provincial 
and territorial laws on referenda or plebiscites. The Court’s recent Senate Reference actually 
suggests that these laws are impermissible: if, as the Court held, Parliament cannot change the 
method of senatorial selection by ordinary legislation,199 then on what basis may Parliament or a 
provincial or territorial legislature change the law governing formal amendment in Canada by 
ordinary legislation? The reasonable answer is that ordinary legislative attempts to circumvent the 
formal amendment rules entrenched in the Constitution of Canada should be treated as equally 
invalid. As to the Court’s own new restrictive interpretation of Canada’s formal amendment rules, 
it is unclear what recourse political actors have short of questioning the legitimacy of the Court’s 
role in informally modifying the textually-entrenched standard required for formal amendment. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The entrenchment of formal amendment rules should reflect the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for modifying the constitutional text. Yet in Canada the already onerous formal 
amendment rules have been modified extra-textually by judicial interpretation, parliamentary and 
provincial as well as territorial law, and arguably also by constitutional convention. The result has 
been to make a rigid constitution even more rigid, and perhaps even to elevate the Constitution of 
Canada above the United States Constitution on the scale of amendment difficulty for major 
constitutional amendments. But measuring amendment difficulty is itself a difficult task that, if it 
is to be done correctly, should include a variable to measure the culture of amendment in a given 
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regime, something that is hard not only to measure but also to identify.200 What is perhaps most 
difficult of all, however, is to deny that formal amendment pursuant to the default or unanimity 
procedure for major constitutional reform in Canada has today become virtually impossible. 
But we should not view constitutional rigidity as a flaw. Perhaps it is feature of the 
Constitution of Canada. The authors of the Constitution Act, 1982 made it difficult to achieve the 
necessary majorities for a formal amendment with good reason: to protect the institutions of 
government from the vagaries of the political process. By requiring that certain constitutional 
changes occur only with recourse to the high threshold of the default multilateral amendment 
procedure or the higher threshold of the unanimity procedure, we ensure that the changes we make 
reflect the considered judgment of the democratic community. The difficulty of formal amendment 
may therefore be a way to verify the commitment of political actors to make the required effort, 
and also to incur the political risk that amendment failure entails, to transform the Constitution of 
Canada into something other than what the authoring generation envisioned.  
The problem, however, arises where political actors change the rules of formal amendment 
in ways other than the formal amendment rules authorize. Whether these informal changes to 
formal amendment rules make the Constitution of Canada harder or easier to amend is not the 
point: it is that these informal changes to formal amendment rules do not play by the rules of the 
game for constitutional change. It is no justification of extra-textual restrictions on formal 
amendment to defend them as innovative mechanisms that help political actors overcome the 
intransigence of the formal amendment process. Political actors are bound by the constitutional 
text to work within its established framework, not to find ways to circumvent it. 
It is true that the Constitution of Canada is different in an important respect from the United 
States Constitution: it is not a master-text constitution. The Constitution of Canada is a partially 
codified and uncodified document that admits of many idiosyncrasies.201 Perhaps none better 
reflects the uniqueness of the Constitution of Canada than the phenomenon of constitutional 
desuetude, an informal method of constitutional change that occurs where an entrenched provision 
over time becomes unuseable as a matter of political reality, though not as a matter of law, for 
instance the textually entrenched disallowance and reservation powers, and perhaps also the 
legislative override.202 One might well argue that it is therefore not problematic for the theory and 
practice of constitutionalism in Canada to graft conceptually onto the constitutional text the kinds 
of extra-textual restrictions on the amendment power that have occurred by judicial interpretation, 
statute and convention. After all, as Hans Kelsen wrote about constitutional change, “there is no 
legal possibility of preventing a constitution from being modified by way of custom, even if the 
constitution has the character of statutory law, if it is a so-called ‘written’ constitution’”.203 
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But what is ultimately lost in leaving these extra-textual restrictions uncodified is the core 
promise of written constitutionalism: fair notice to the people about the rules by which their 
representatives are to exercise official authority, a textual referent for the people to hold 
accountable their representatives and for the political class to hold itself to account, and symmetry 
between the expectations the constitutional text creates and the outcomes it generates. Codified 
constitutions of course have many functions: they structure the framework of government, they 
entrench rights and freedoms, and they express values. The principal function of a codified 
constitution, in my view, is to create rules by which political actors discharge their official duties. 
Those rules are of course changeable, but they must change according to the rules prescribed for 
that purpose. Where those rules change in ways not prescribed—and consequently unannounced 
to either the people or their representatives—the risk is to undermine the legal, political and indeed 
the moral force of the constitutional text to structure and constrain the conduct of political actors. 
